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1. Introduction 
I use ‘bare plural’ to refer to generic sentences of the form ‘Ks F’, where ‘F’ 
is a predicate and ‘K’—loosely speaking—is a kind term.1,2 For example, 
‘Ducks lay eggs’, ‘Cars have wheels’, and ‘Philosophers are crafty’ are all 
bare plurals.  
It is unclear how to provide a uniform semantics for bare plurals. 
There is no consensus on what semantics to assign bare plurals.3 And yet, 
bare plurals pervade natural language. Bare plurals have even been put to 
substantial philosophical work.4 It would be philosophically fruitful, then, to 
understand how they work. 
Are bare plurals really all that puzzling? Many are initially attracted 
to a “simple” account of bare plurals, on which ‘Ks F’ is true iff, normally, 
all Ks F. After all, many bare plurals seem to express information about 
what is normal for a member of the kind in question. This simple account is, 
however, susceptible to various counterexamples. The bare plural ‘Ducks 
lay eggs’ seems true, but it is false that, normally, all ducks lay eggs. After 
all, there is nothing abnormal about a duck’s being male. But no male duck 
ever lays eggs. Moreover, the bare plural ‘Mosquitoes transmit malaria’ 
seems true and yet it is false that, normally, all mosquitoes transmit malaria. 
Less than 1% of mosquitoes have ever transmitted malaria. Only an abnor-
mal mosquito transmits malaria. Therefore, the simple account is untenable 
(Leslie 2007, p. 380). 
Semantic theorizing about bare plurals is not easy. I proceed, in §2, 
by systematically observing the many ways in which we use bare plurals. 
This “messy” feature of bare plurals is, I think, the key to theorizing about 
them. In §3, I develop a novel account that promises a simple, uniform se-
mantics for bare plurals. On this view, bare plurals fail to semantically ex-
                                                 
1 For convenience, I omit corner quotes in favor of single quotation marks. 
2 I restrict my attention to individual-level bare plurals. What are excluded from my 
purview are kind-level bare plurals. Intuitively, an individual-level bare plural is 
about the individual members of some kind. A kind-level bare plural is about the 
kind itself. For instance, ‘Bachelors are unmarried’ is an individual-level bare plu-
ral, whereas ‘Dinosaurs are extinct’ is a kind-level bare plural. Individual bachelors 
are unmarried. But individual dinosaurs are not rare. For some discussion of this 
distinction, see Krifka (1987) and Leslie and Lerner (2016). 
3 For a recent overview of the literature on the semantics of bare plurals, see Sterken 
(2017). 
4 For instance, see Asher and Bonevac (1996), Cheng (2011), Haslanger (2010), 
Haslanger (2014), Johnston and Leslie (2012), Lerner and Leslie (2013), Leslie 
(2017), Nickel (2010), Sorensen (2012), and Wasserman (2011). 
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press propositions. Nonetheless, speakers still utter them in order to make 
assertions. Finally, in §4, I reply to objections. 
 
2. The Variety Data 
There is a wide range of non-figurative uses that bare plurals may be put to. 
This phenomenon, which I call ‘the variety data’, must be accommodated by 
any satisfactory account of bare plurals. I will present a novel and systemat-
ic taxonomy of this variety.  There are four different classes falling under 
the variety data: homoplural statistical variety, heteroplural statistical varie-
ty, homoplural use variety, and heteroplural use variety. 
 
2.1 Homoplural Statistical Variety  
Homoplural statistical variety is the phenomenon by which different tokens 
of the same bare plural type are used to assert different statistical generaliza-
tions.5 For example, suppose that John desperately needs money by the end 
of the month and earnestly asks Sally if it is a good idea for him to buy lot-
tery tickets. Sally replies by uttering ‘No, lottery tickets are losers’. It seems 
that by uttering ‘Lottery tickets are losers’, Sally asserts something true—
that almost all lottery tickets are losers.  
Contrast this case with one in which Donald is a wealthy billionaire 
who, for some peculiar reason, believes that all lottery tickets are losers. 
Donald is so confident in this belief that he signed a legal contract stating 
that he is to give any future lottery winners a billion dollars. Donald’s close 
friend reprimands him for making this decision. In reply, Donald utters ‘Lot-
tery tickets are losers’. By uttering this generic, it seems that Donald asserts, 
falsely, that all lottery tickets are losers.  
I have provided two cases in which ‘Lottery tickets are losers’ differ 
in truth-value. In one case, ‘Lottery tickets are losers’ is used to assert that 
almost all lottery tickets are losers.6 In another case, it is used to assert that 
all lottery tickets are losers. We have before us two tokens and two different 
statistical generalizations. Therefore, homoplural statistical variety exists. 
 
2.2 Heteroplural Statistical Variety 
Heteroplural statistical variety is the phenomenon by which different tokens 
of different bare plurals are used to assert different statistical generaliza-
tions. Such variation is evident upon considering the three generics ‘Sharks 
kill bathers’, ‘Barns are red’, and ‘Prime numbers are odd’. A speaker easily 
asserts a truth by uttering ‘Sharks kill bathers’. Such speaker might assert, 
for instance, that a few sharks kill bathers. A speaker also easily asserts a 
truth by uttering ‘Barns are red’. Such a speaker might assert, for instance, 
that many barns are red.7 On the other hand, a speaker cannot easily assert a 
                                                 
5 Statistical generalizations are expressed by quantified sentences. 
6 These cases are variants of cases that Sterken (2015a, p. 18) develops. 
7 If only a few barns were red, it seems the speaker speaks falsely. 
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truth by uttering ‘Prime numbers are odd’. Such a speaker might assert the 
falsehood that all prime numbers are odd. (After all, 2 is an even prime.) 
I have provided different bare plurals that used to assert different 
statistical generalizations. Therefore, heteroplural statistical variety exists. 
 
2.3 Homoplural Use Variety 
Homoplural statistical variety is the phenomenon by which different tokens 
of the same bare plural are used to assert different sorts of propositions alto-
gether.8 Consider the bare plural ‘Ravens are black’. Suppose that all ravens 
have been painted white earlier today. Now consider the following two cas-
es.  
First, Oliver is an ornithologist giving a lecture on the properties 
that ravens are, in general, biologically disposed to have. By uttering ‘Ra-
vens are black’, he seems to assert something true. In this context, the bare 
plural is used to assert the true proposition that, under normal circumstanc-
es, almost all ravens are black. 
Second, Mary is playing a game in which she is to guess the color of 
a randomly chosen raven. She does not know that any ravens have been 
painted white. She, then, asserts something false by uttering ‘Ravens are 
black’. After all, Mary is only interested in the actual color of ravens. In this 
context, she asserts the false proposition that most ravens are black by utter-
ing ‘Ravens are black’. 
I have provided two cases in which ‘Ravens are black’ is used to as-
sert different sorts of propositions. In the former case, the speaker asserts a 
proposition about what is normal for ravens. In the latter case, the speaker 
asserts a statistical generalization over actual, presently existing ravens. 
Therefore, homoplural statistical variety exists.9 
 
                                                 
8 I largely leave the notion of a “sort” of proposition at an intuitive level. Here are 
some examples to help illustrate what I mean by ‘sort of proposition’. ‘All bachelors 
are unmarried’ expresses (1) a statistical generalization, ‘Under normal circum-
stances, most turtles die young’ expresses (2) a proposition about what is normal, 
and ‘Ideally, everyone is virtuous’ expresses (3) a proposition about what is ideal. 
These are all different sorts of propositions. 
9 Countless other instances of homoplural use variety could be given. Here is anoth-
er pair of cases. First, suppose that Jim believes that (i) all boys should cry but also 
that (ii) no boys, in fact, cry. Jim utters ‘Boys don’t cry’ in the presence of an atten-
tive audience that is fully aware of Jim’s odd belief that (ii). Jim thereby asserts, 
falsely, that all boys don’t cry—a statistical generalization. Second, suppose that 
Dale is a mean-spirited father who firmly believes that no boy should ever cry. One 
day, Dale sees his young son crying and utters ‘Boys don’t cry’. Dale thereby as-
serts that, ideally, all boys don’t cry. In the former case, a statistical generalization 
is asserted. In the latter case, a proposition about what is ideal is asserted. (I intend 
to use ‘ideally’ in an intuitive manner, but, as suggested by a reviewer, I would have 
no problem understanding ‘ideally’ in the technical, kind-relative sense employed 
by Leslie (2015b).) 
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2.4 Heteroplural Use Variety 
Heteroplural use variety is the phenomenon by which speakers use different 
tokens of different bare plural types in order to assert different sorts of prop-
ositions. Some bare plurals, for example, are used to assert what it is to be a 
member of a kind. For example, ‘Round squares are round’ may be used to 
assert the proposition that, by definition, all round squares are round. Bare 
plurals are also sometimes used to assert propositions concerning what is 
normal. For example, ‘Ravens are black’, in certain contexts, is used to as-
sert some proposition about what is normal for ravens. Additionally, bare 
plurals can be used to assert normative claims. For example, ‘Boys don’t 
cry’ is used, in some contexts, to assert some (false) proposition about what 
ought to be the case. Finally, bare plurals may be used to assert some propo-
sition about the capacities of the members of a kind. For instance, it seems 
that an overprotective parent may utter ‘Tabletop corners hurt babies’ in 
order to assert that, in general, tabletop corners can hurt babies. 
 
2.5 The Import of the Variety Data 
As the variety data indicates, bare plurals are non-figuratively used to assert 
a wide range of propositions. That is, speakers are able to—without speak-
ing figuratively—use bare plurals to make a wide range of assertions. Any 
adequate account of bare plurals must provide some explanation of this vari-
ety data. But many influential accounts of bare plurals struggle to accom-
modate the variety data. I survey some such views below. 
 Roughly, Ariel Cohen (1999, pp. 55–56) claims that any bare plural 
‘Ks F’ is true just in case either (i) most Ks F or (ii) the probability that a 
randomly chosen K Fs is higher than the probability that a randomly chosen 
individual that has an alternative property to being a K itself Fs.10 Cohen’s 
account then incorrectly predicts that ‘Prime numbers are odd’ is true. Not 
only are most prime numbers odd, the probability that a prime number is 
odd is much higher than the probability that a non-prime number is odd. So, 
the relevant instances of both (i) and (ii) are true. So, Cohen is committed to 
claiming that ‘Prime numbers are odd’ is true. But, intuitively, this bare plu-
ral can be straightforwardly used to assert, falsely, that all prime numbers 
are odd. Cohen’s account, then, fails to accommodate statistical variety.  
Roughly, Bernhard Nickel (2016, p. 64) claims that Ks F just in case 
there is a normal way of being a K such that all Ks that are normal in this 
way F. But then Nickel cannot accommodate homoplural or heteroplural use 
variety. Consider a case in which almost all ravens have been painted white 
and Alice, who is unaware of the painting, utters ‘Ravens are black’ in order 
to assert the (false) statistical generalization that almost all ravens are 
black.11 Nickel incorrectly predicts that ‘Ravens are black’ is true in that 
context, since being black is a normal way of being a raven such that all ra-
                                                 
10 Clause (ii) provides simplified truth conditions for what Cohen calls a ‘relative 
generic’. Nothing of importance here rests on this simplification. 
11 Perhaps Alice is playing the color-guessing game Mary played in §2.3. 
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vens that are normal in this way are black. Utterances of ‘Ks F’ are not al-
ways about what is normal for the Ks. 
David Liebesman (2011, p. 417) treats all bare plurals as direct-kind 
predications. That is, Ks F just in case the kind K itself Fs. For example, 
Liebesman would claim that ‘Tigers are striped’ is true just in case the tiger 
kind (Panthera tigris) is itself striped. This account, however, leaves hetero-
plural statistical variety completely unexplained. ‘Prime numbers are odd’ 
seems false even though almost all prime numbers are odd; on the other 
hand, ‘Mosquitoes transmit malaria’ seems true even though almost no 
mosquitoes transmit malaria. Liebesman (2011, 420) tells us that “[t]he rela-
tionship between kinds and their members is…unsystematic.” But this is 
utterly mysterious. It would be much more preferable to give a deeper ex-
planation of why we have the intuitions we do about, for instance, ‘Prime 
numbers are odd’ and ‘Mosquitoes transmit malaria’. 
 Sarah-Jane Leslie (2007, p. 382) claims that bare plurals express 
cognitively primitive generalizations. But what is crucial for our purposes is 
that she gives a purely disquotational semantics for Gen, a commonly posit-
ed binary operator that relates the restrictor and scope in a bare plural: 
 
 Gen x [Restrictor(x) [Scope(x)] 
 
However, as Rachel Sterken (2015b, p. 2503) points out, a purely disquota-
tional semantics of Gen does not predict context-sensitivity. All we are told 
is that ‘Ks F’ is true iff Gen x [K(x)][F(x)], but we are not told anything else 
about the semantics of Gen.  But context-sensitivity appears to be precisely 
what homoplural statistical and use variety suggest exists. Therefore, the 
variety data is left unexplained on Leslie’s account. 
 If we were to revise Leslie’s account to make it predict context-
sensitivity, we would turn Gen into an indexical. After all, as Sterken 
(2015a) has argued, bare plurals are context-sensitive in a way that the cor-
responding sentences containing overt adverbs of quantification like ‘typi-
cally’ or ‘generally’ are not. But now we are considering Sterken’s (2015a) 
view, on which Gen is an indexical. This account can—at least in princi-
ple—readily accommodate the variety data, but, as we shall see in §3, I 
think the variety data can be explained without positing Gen. As I will elab-
orate on at the end of §3, doing without Gen is an advantage.  
 
3. The Radical Account 
I will defend a novel account of bare plurals, which I call ‘the radical ac-
count’, that explains the variety data pragmatically. This aspect of the view, 
I hope, will prove appealing. One striking commitment of the view is that all 
bare plurals are semantically incomplete. That is, no bare plural expresses a 
proposition.12 
                                                 
12 The radical view starkly contrasts with previously developed views, on which 
bare plurals do express propositions. For a sample of such views, see Asher and 
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Before returning to the virtues of the radical account, I must intro-
duce the pragmatic notion—Kent Bach’s (1994) impliciture—that it appeals 
to. It is a familiar idea that speakers often do not mean what they, strictly 
speaking, say.13 Speakers can speak figuratively. Moreover, speakers can 
implicate things by meaning what they say and something else in addition to 
what is said. This is well-trodden territory.14  
What is less familiar is the idea that speakers can mean just one 
proposition by meaning everything they say, plus some additional content. 
In such cases, what is meant is partly constituted by what is said. In these 
cases, the speaker implicites—not implicates—what she means. A speaker 
speaks in a subtly non-literal way whenever she implicites something. What 
she means is distinct from, though very closely related to, what is said. What 
is meant—and asserted—is conceptually built out of what is said. What is 
added to what is said is determined by the speaker’s communicative inten-
tions. 
In the cases of impliciture that interest me here, the speaker utters a 
semantically incomplete sentence. Semantically incomplete sentences fail to 
express any proposition whatsoever in any context.15 What is said by utter-
ing a semantically incomplete sentence does not constitute a proposition. 
What is said in these cases is a mere propositional radical. In such cases, 
the speaker completes what is said to assert a proposition. The speaker relies 
on the fact that her audience expects her, the speaker, to make a relevant 
conversational contribution. Given this fact, the speaker intends her audi-
ence to ascertain what she means by an utterance. 
Consider the following sentence, (Ready): 
 
(Ready) Ann is ready. 
 
(Ready) is a sentence, but does not express any proposition. It only express-
es a propositional radical. Ann cannot be ready simpliciter. Nonetheless, a 
speaker may utter (Ready) in order to make an assertion. For instance, if the 
speaker and her audience are in the midst of making dinner plans, this 
speaker may utter (Ready) in order to assert that Ann is ready to attend din-
ner. The speaker completed what is said to make an assertion (Bach 1994, 
128).   
                                                                                                                  
Pelletier (1997), Cohen (1999), Krifka et al. (1995), Leslie (2007), Liebesman 
(2011), Nickel (2009), Nickel (2016), Sterken (2015a), and Wasserman (2011).  
13 I will henceforth use a strict notion of what is said so that a speaker S says P in 
context c by uttering e iff the semantic content of e in c is P. Similarly, I henceforth 
use will ‘express’ so that e expresses P in context c iff the semantic content of e in c 
is P. 
14 For the seminal work on this topic, see Grice 1989b. 
15 I am assuming that the semantic minimalism of Cappelen and Lepore (2005) is 
false. I deny that every declarative sentence expresses some proposition. See Bach 
(2006) and Carston (2008) for critical discussion of semantic minimalism. 
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One objection to the claim that completion sometimes occurs is Ja-
son Stanley’s (2000) variable binding argument. In the sentence ‘Whatever 
Mary wants to do, Ann is ready’, the expression ‘Whatever Mary wants to 
do’ seems to bind some variable that takes on—as its semantic value—
activities that Ann is ready for. The variable binding argument concludes 
that the unembedded sentence ‘Ann is ready’ simply expresses different 
propositions in different contexts—the variable ranging over activities Ann 
is ready for just takes on, as its semantic value, whatever activity is contex-
tually salient. The variable binding argument, if sound, seems to generalize 
to any purportedly semantically incomplete sentence. 
 A detailed discussion of the variable binding argument is outside the 
scope of this paper. The argument has received much critical discussion. 
See, for instance, Bach (2000), Carston and Hall (2017), Recanati (2002), 
Cappelen and Lepore (2002), Hall (2008), and Sennet (2008). I will only 
briefly mention one reason why one might be skeptical of the variable bind-
ing argument: It is unclear if the bound reading is a genuine semantic read-
ing of the sentence as opposed to something that is merely easily conveyed 
by that sentence. Consider ‘Whatever Mary wants to do, Ann is ready’ once 
again. Suppose that Mary is Ann’s archenemy and tries her hardest to foil 
Ann’s plans. Moreover, suppose that Ann is preparing feverishly for an im-
portant speech. An informed speaker can utter ‘Whatever Mary wants to do, 
Ann is ready’ in order to assert that, whatever Mary wants to do, Ann is 
ready to give her speech. Here, what it is claimed that Ann is ready for is not 
determined by what Mary wants to do; in fact, Mary—being Ann’s archen-
emy—may want that Ann not give her speech. The bound reading of the 
sentence may simply be the content of what is asserted given a common 
completion: to do that thing. The proponent of the variable binding argu-
ment assumes that the bound reading of a quantificational sentence is a gen-
uine semantic interpretation of it, but this may precisely be what we should 
reject.16 
 Let us put aside the variable binding argument and return to our 
general discussion of completion. Only some completions are allowed. It 
would seem be an instance of figurative speech, for instance, to utter ‘Ann is 
ready’ and to thereby assert that Ann is not ready to attend dinner. Why is 
this so? A good question, but one I do not propose to answer here. What I 
require for my purposes is that speakers sometimes complete what they, 
strictly speaking, say. I leave it to future work to develop a general account 
of which completions are allowed for any given propositional radical.17 
                                                 
16 This is effectively Bach’s (2000) response. For the case of Ann and Mary consid-
ered here, I am indebted to Troy Cross. 
17 And lest you become skeptical that speakers ever complete what they say, I ask 
you to consider subsentential expressions. Suppose that Alice is at a restaurant in 
Spain, that the only word of Spanish Alice recognizes and understands is ‘agua’ 
(Spanish for ‘water’), and that Alice knows that her waiter does not recognize or 
understand any English whatsoever. Alice may nonetheless utter ‘agua’ in order to 
assert that she wants water. The word ‘agua’ clearly expresses a mere propositional 
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(Though she works in a relevance-theoretic framework, Hall’s (2008) sug-
gestion that completion—or as she calls it, pragmatic enrichment—is con-
strained by “a process of local [and minimal] adjustments of logical form to 
warrant [relevant] implicatures” (p.542) may be promising.)18 
 On the radical account of bare plurals, all bare plurals are semanti-
cally incomplete. They only express propositional radicals. Speakers com-
plete what is said in order to make assertions. The speaker’s communicative 
intentions determine what is added to what is said.  
Here is a case that provides some evidence that bare plurals are se-
mantically incomplete. Suppose that it was recently discovered that there are 
things called ‘zorks’ and an activity called ‘flibbetting’. Supposing that any 
sentence may be used literally and that bare plurals express propositions, 
‘Zorks flibbet’ should express a proposition. But it is unclear that it does. 
What does the world have to be like in order for this bare plural to be true? 
Do all zorks have to flibbet? Just some? Or, under normal circumstances, all 
zorks? Or something else? Especially in light of the variety data, I do not 
have any clear intuitions as to what the world would have to be like so that 
zorks flibbet simpliciter.19 This is naturally explained if all bare plurals are 
semantically incomplete. Nothing evaluable for truth is expressed by any 
bare plural. 
It seems that what is missing in ‘Zorks flibbet’ is a quantifier ex-
pression. How many zorks is the speaker talking about? The speaker must 
contribute a quantifier if she is to make an assertion. She does so through 
completion. 
But sometimes, something else besides a quantifier is added by 
completion. This arises when the speaker is asserting something besides a 
pure statistical generalization. For example, the speaker may be asserting 
something about what is normal for the members of the kind being dis-
                                                                                                                  
radical, and yet Alice may complete it in order to make an assertion. Observe that, 
even here, not just any completion is allowed. Alice cannot (non-figuratively) assert 
that she does not want water by uttering ‘agua’. For an objection to the view that 
subsentential expressions can be used to make assertions, see Stanley (2000, pp. 
407–409). For replies, see Elugardo and Stainton (2004) and Stainton (2006). 
18 Work such as Hall’s (2007) aims to address Stanley’s (2002) concern that prag-
matic approaches overgenerate readings. 
19 Notice the analogy between ‘Ann is ready’ and ‘Zorks flibbet’. Without suffi-
ciently rich mutual background beliefs about Ann (and what activities are of con-
versational relevant), one cannot successfully convey a proposition to her audience 
by uttering ‘Ann is ready’. Analogously, without sufficiently rich mutual back-
ground beliefs about zorks and flibetting, one cannot successfully convey a proposi-
tion to her audience by uttering ‘Zorks flibett’. These observations are straightfor-
wardly explained if ‘Ann is ready’ and ‘Zorks flibbet’ are both semantically incom-
plete.  
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cussed. In such cases, the content of a sentential operator or a modal verb—
in addition to a quantifier—is added to what is said.20 
Below are seven examples of possible completions:21 
 
(1) [A few] mosquitoes transmit malaria. 
(2) [Many] barns are red. 
(3) [All] prime numbers are odd. 
(4) [Under normal circumstances, almost all] ravens are black. 
(5) [By definition, all] round squares are round. 
(6) [Ideally, all] boys don’t cry. 
(7) [All] orange crushers [can] crush oranges. 
 
A speaker may utter ‘Mosquitoes transmit malaria’ in order to assert that a 
few mosquitoes transmit malaria. Similarly, a speaker may utter ‘Barns are 
red’ in order to assert that many barns are red. Moreover, an imprudent 
mathematics student may utter ‘Prime numbers are odd’ in order to assert 
that all prime numbers are odd. These three bare plurals are used to convey 
mere statistical generalizations.  
When a speaker is concerned with the properties that ravens are in-
trinsically disposed to have as a result of their genetic endowment, she may 
utter ‘Ravens are black’ in order to assert that, under normal circumstances, 
almost all ravens are black. This bare plural is used to assert a proposition 
about what is normal for ravens. Furthermore, when a speaker is concerned 
with what it is to be a round square, she may utter ‘Round squares are 
round’ in order to assert that, by definition, all round squares are round. This 
bare plural is used to assert a proposition about what it is to be a round 
square. (This is especially plausible because it is impossible for anything to 
be a round square.) Moreover, when a speaker is concerned with what is 
ideal for boys, she may utter ‘Boys don’t cry’ in order to assert that, ideally, 
all boys don’t cry. This bare plural is used to assert a (false) proposition 
about what is ideal. Finally, even if no orange crushers have ever been used 
to crush oranges, a speaker may utter ‘Orange crushers crush oranges’ in 
order to assert that all orange crushers can crush oranges. This bare plural is 
used to assert a proposition about the capacities of orange crushers. 
 The seven completions in (1)–(7) are not the only completions pos-
sible. Sufficiently vary conversational goals and the mutually held beliefs of 
the speaker and audience, and the completions will vary too. 
Allow me to outline the advantages of this account of bare plurals. It 
easily accommodates the feature of bare plurals in need of explanation—the 
variety data. The speaker’s communicative intentions determine which 
                                                 
20 I believe Bach (1994) would have us appeal to a sort of impliciture he calls ‘ex-
pansion’—in addition to completion—when something besides a quantifier is added 
to the content of a bare plural. In order to ease discussion, however, I gloss over this 
complication. 
21 The material in brackets indicates the content that is added by completion. 
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proposition is asserted, or communicated.22 Just as the speaker’s communi-
cative intentions may differ wildly across different contexts, the proposition 
communicated by uttering a bare plural may differ wildly across different 
contexts. 
The radical account has a distinct methodological advantage over 
standard accounts of bare plurals. The radical account makes room for a 
simpler semantics.23 It does not posit covert syntactic structure that other 
accounts posit.24 Standard accounts of bare plurals posit Gen, a supposedly 
covert quantifier, which is mysteriously never pronounced in any natural 
language (Leslie 2008, p. 4; Liebesman 2011, pp. 414–415). The semantics 
for Gen are also incredibly controversial. The radical account allows us to 
do away with this vexed will-o’-the-wisp altogether. I thus agree with 
Liebesman’s claim that “Gen has proven [semantically] intractable for a 
very simple reason: it doesn’t exist” (2011, p. 411). 
Instead of Gen, the radical account merely appeals to the contents of 
familiar quantifier expressions (e.g. ‘many’ and ‘all’), sentential operators 
(e.g. ‘under normal circumstances’, ‘by definition’, and ‘ideally’), and mod-
al verbs (e.g. ‘can’) that commonly appear in natural language. We already 
had to develop a semantics for such expressions. The radical account is thus 
appealingly parsimonious. 
This is, by the way, the main advantage that the radical account has 
over Sterken’s (2015a). On her account, Gen is an indexical that is context-
sensitive enough to accommodate the variety. However, it still posits Gen, 
which I find costly enough to warrant preferring the radical account. But, at 
the very least, the radical account should be taken as a serious contender in 
the debates over the semantics and pragmatics of bare plurals. 
 
4. Objections 
I reply to nine objections to the radical account. The first four objections 
concern pretheoretic intuitions about the semantics of bare plurals. The fifth 
objection concerns language acquisition. The next three objections concern 
seemingly syntactic evidence for Gen. The final objection concerns the ex-
planatory power of the radical account. 
 
 
 
                                                 
22 Of course, for the speaker’s communicative intention to be reasonable, she must 
reasonably believe that her audience can ascertain what she intends to communicate. 
For more discussion of this point, see §4.2. 
23 Grice’s Modified Occam’s Razor—a principle stating that “senses [semantic 
meanings] are not to be multiplied beyond necessity” (Grice 1989a, p. 47)—thus 
favors the radical account. For detailed discussion of Grice’s Modified Occam’s 
Razor, see Bontly (2005). 
24 With that said, the radical account is distinct from Liebesman’s (2011) account, 
which also does not posit covert syntactic structure. For some critical discussion of 
Liebesman’s view, see Leslie (2015a) and Sterken (2016). 
11 
 
4.1. Bare Plurals Without Truth-Value 
One obvious objection is that bare plurals clearly have truth-values. ‘Bache-
lors are unmarried’ is true! Bare plurals have truth-values, and the radical 
account denies this obvious fact. 
 This initially plausible objection can be met. I will provide an error 
theory for why we have the intuition that bare plurals have truth-values. 
These intuitions are not to be explained, but to be explained away. People 
are largely sensitive to non-semantic facts. Concerning communication, our 
intuitions are primed to allow us to ascertain what the speaker means by say-
ing what she said. In general, what sentences mean is of less communicative 
importance than what the speaker means. The use of sentences serves to fa-
cilitate communication. In everyday conversation, we are primarily interest-
ed in what our conversational partners are trying to communicate, not the 
semantic meanings of the linguistic expressions they utter. Importantly, in 
communicating, we need not be reliable at (consciously) distinguishing be-
tween semantic and non-semantic information in order to be sensitive to 
semantic information. Hence, our seemingly semantic intuitions that osten-
sibly concern the meanings of sentences are, in fact, often intuitions con-
cerning what is ordinary communicated by uttering those sentences.25 
 Arguably, in assessing what it takes for a sentence to be true, people 
generally imagine the sentence’s being uttered in ordinary contexts and then 
see what is required for the truth of what is communicated. As a result, it is 
unsurprising that we would have the intuition that bare plurals have truth-
values even if, in fact, they do not. After all, bare plurals are ordinarily used 
to communicate truth-apt propositions.  
 One might wonder why this explanation does not overgeneralize to 
subsentential expressions that clearly fail to express propositions but can 
nonetheless be used to make assertions.26 For example, if someone sees 
smoke, she might utter ‘fire’ in order to assert that the smoke is caused by 
some fire. But clearly, ‘fire’ does not express a proposition; it is obvious to 
any competent English speaker that ‘fire’ is neither true nor false. But this 
may seem problematic for my suggestion that we often confuse the content 
of what is asserted by uttering an expression with that expression’s semantic 
content. Why is it so obvious that ‘fire’ does not express a proposition? 
 I reply that my explanation is only intended to apply to declarative 
sentences. The relevant difference between a bare plural and ‘fire’ is that the 
former is a sentence and the latter is not. Semantically incomplete sentenc-
es—which express mere propositional radicals—that are often used to make 
assertions can often be mistaken for semantically complete sentences that do 
express propositions. The word ‘fire’, and other subsentential expressions, 
however, “wear” their semantic incompleteness on their sleeves: Of course 
they do not express propositions! In natural language, only sentences ex-
                                                 
25 For further discussion of this point, see Bach (2002, pp. 24–26);  Bach (2001b, 
pp. 26–27); Borg (2005, p. 255); and Soames (2008, p. 460). 
26 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for bringing this worry to my attention. 
12 
 
press propositions. As youths, we are taught that sentences express full, 
complete thoughts whereas individual words do not. We often mistakenly 
believe that bare plurals, but not ‘fire’, express propositions for a simple 
reason: Bare plurals are much more similar to the paradigmatic example of a 
semantically complete sentence (e.g. ‘All bachelors are unmarried’) than 
‘fire’ is. 
 
4.2. Excessive Truth 
It may be objected that the radical account allows intuitively false bare plu-
rals to be straightforwardly used to communicate truths. For example, the 
bare plural ‘Mosquitoes do not transmit malaria’ does not seem capable of 
being used to communicate a truth in any context. But, on the account de-
fended here, this bare plural may be used to communicate a truth if the 
speaker intends to communicate that most mosquitoes do not transmit malar-
ia. In short, it does not seem that a speaker could straightforwardly com-
municate a truth by uttering ‘Mosquitoes do not transmit malaria’. But the 
radical account denies this. 
 This objection takes advantage of our intuitions regarding what is 
communicated by uttering bare plurals in ordinary contexts. Usually, a 
speaker would not utter ‘Mosquitoes do not transmit malaria’ unless she 
falsely believed that no mosquitoes transmit malaria. In ordinary contexts, a 
speaker could not reasonably intend to communicate that most mosquitoes 
do not transmit malaria by uttering ‘Mosquitoes do not transmit malaria’. 
This is so because she cannot reasonably believe that her audience would 
interpret her correctly. 
 However, there are unusual contexts in which a speaker could 
communicate that most mosquitoes do not transmit malaria by uttering 
‘Mosquitoes do not transmit malaria’. For instance, suppose that everyone is 
vaccinated against malaria. As a result, Sam and his audience truly believe 
that malaria is harmless. Sam may then utter ‘Mosquitoes do not transmit 
malaria’ in order to communicate that most mosquitoes do not transmit ma-
laria just as easily as I can utter ‘Barns are not yellow’ in order to communi-
cate that most barns are not yellow. Given the (unusual) context, we do not 
have the intuition that Sam communicates a falsehood by uttering ‘Mosqui-
toes do not transmit malaria’. 
 Other intuitively false bare plurals—such as ‘Prime numbers are 
odd’, ‘Mammals lay eggs’, and ‘Chickens are female’—can be similarly 
accommodated. In most ordinary contexts, the speaker cannot reasonably 
intend to communicate a truth by uttering such bare plurals, since she does 
not believe that her audience will interpret her correctly. She must com-
municate the generalization by (i) using an explicitly quantified sentence or 
by (ii) being in such an unusual context that she reasonably believes that her 
audience will correctly ascertain what she means by uttering the bare plural. 
Therefore, the radical account does not overgenerate truths. 
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4.3. Indeterminate Meaning 
It may be objected that the radical account allows that it is sometimes inde-
terminate what is communicated by uttering a bare plural.27 For example, 
usually when one utters the bare plural ‘Barns are red’, one fails to intend to 
communicate a specific generalization. Between the two generalizations that 
many barns are red and that most barns are red, which did the speaker intend 
to communicate? It seems indeterminate which proposition is communicat-
ed, as the speaker likely did not intend to communicate one proposition over 
the other. However, it is dubious that what is communicated can be indeter-
minate. 
 This objection incorrectly assumes that what is communicated must 
be determinate. Often, the purposes of a conversation can be met even if 
what is communicated is indeterminate. After all, we often speak loosely 
and imprecisely. For example, if one only needs to communicate that red is 
a common color of barns, it does not matter, when she utters ‘Barns are red’, 
whether she intends to communicate that many barns are red or that most 
barns are red. As Bach (2001a, p. 259) observes, the speaker “might not 
mean any one thing precisely, and be quite prepared to concede that he did 
not mean some one of these things as opposed to any of the others.” Hence, 
it is no objection to the account that what is communicated may be indeter-
minate. 
 
4.4. Collective Action 
It may be objected that the account fails to accommodate bare plurals con-
cerning properties of subgroups of the kind in question. For example, ‘Geese 
form gaggles’ is a bare plural that is not used to communicate a generaliza-
tion over individual geese. After all, no individual goose forms a gaggle! 
Only in groups do geese form gaggles. How can the radical account accom-
modate this phenomenon? So far, we have only seen how the account han-
dles generalizations over individuals. 
 This objection, however, is easily met. One who utters ‘Geese form 
gaggles’ likely intends to communicate a generalization over groups of 
geese, not individual geese. Hence, the speaker likely utters the bare plural 
in order to communicate something like the following proposition:   
 
[Many large groups of] geese form gaggles. 
 
Other bare plurals that are used to communicate generalizations over 
groups—no individuals—can be handled similarly. Therefore, it is no objec-
tion to the account that some bare plurals are used to communicate such 
generalizations. 
 
 
 
                                                 
27 Thanks to Kent Bach and Ezra Schwartz for helpful discussion on this objection. 
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4.5. Language Acquisition 
It may be objected that the radical account fails to accommodate the empiri-
cal fact that children learn how to use bare plural generics before they learn 
how to use quantifier expressions. As Leslie (2007, p. 380, her emphasis) 
observes: 
 
Strangely enough, young children find generics easier to 
acquire and master than explicit quantifiers. Generics ap-
pear in children’s speech very early in development, signifi-
cantly before explicit quantifiers do… And under some cir-
cumstances, it has been found that three-year old children 
will even interpret explicitly quantified statements as 
though they were generics… It seems that they find gener-
ics so much easier to comprehend than quantified state-
ments, they rely on this easier interpretation at times, rather 
than attempting to process the more taxing quantificational 
claim. Explicit quantifiers, whose semantics have proven 
quite tractable for the theorist, are more challenging for the 
young child than generics… 
 
In response to the observation that children learn how to use generics before 
they learn how to use explicitly quantified sentences, I insist that children 
need not learn any quantifier expressions at all in order to use generics to 
communicate generalizations.28 Perhaps the quantifiers supplied by comple-
tion will even fail to be the contents of any quantifier expressions of English 
if “generics [can] give voice to our most [cognitively] primitive generaliza-
tions” (Leslie 2007, p. 382).29 
 Some empirical evidence supports the claim that children have a 
tacit understanding of quantification before ever learning any explicit quan-
tifier expressions.30 David Barner et al. (2007) and Barner et al. (2008) re-
                                                 
28 That a speaker may (non-figuratively) communicate some proposition without 
knowing any sentence that would express that proposition is not mysterious. Sup-
pose that Bob is a young toddler who only knows how to use the two words ‘I’ and 
‘water’. Importantly, Bob need not know how to use ‘want’ or any word synony-
mous with it. Nonetheless, it seems that Bob may communicate that he wants water 
by uttering ‘I water’. 
29 For critical discussion of Leslie’s (2007) claim that generics give voice to cogni-
tively primitive generalizations, see Sterken (2015b, p. 2507). 
30 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for not only pressing me to find empirical evi-
dence for the thesis that children can generalize before having the linguistic ability 
to represent generalization, but also for also helpfully pointing me towards some 
relevant work in psychology. This same reviewer also wonders if there is good em-
pirical reason to think that children who use bare plurals have the ability to form the 
communicative intentions the radical account requires that they do. My answer is a 
tentative ‘yes’. Tauzin and Gergeley (2018) find that “pragmatic inferential capacity 
for communicative mindreading does not depend on verbal capacities and can be 
induced by purely non-verbal signals that are indicative of ostensive communication 
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port that “under some circumstances 15-month-old infants and Rhesus ma-
caques spontaneously represent the distinction between individuals and sets 
of multiple individuals” (Carey, 2009, p. 261). If such young, prelinguistic 
infants and nonlinguistic primates can make some generalizations about plu-
ralities, then it should be no surprise that children are able to competently 
make generalizations using bare plurals by the time they are two years old. 
There is no need to posit a linguistic capacity to represent generalizations in 
order to explain children’s ability to generalize; this, in fact, puts the cart 
before the horse. We should take seriously the result that “we have found 
another representational ability available to prelinguistic creatures: the ca-
pacity for set-based quantification and the distinction between one and some 
[and thus the capacity to make generalizations]” (Carey, 2009, p. 263). 
 In any case, given that the radical account is true, it is unsurprising 
that children learn how to use bare plural generics before they learn how to 
use quantifier expressions. Bare plurals are useful for efficiently communi-
cating information about members of a kind. I agree with Sterken’s (2015a, 
p. 26) claim that “the requisite abilit[y] to acquire generics [is] the cognitive 
or conceptual ability to generalise in some way.” Why fix something that 
isn’t broken? If children can convey what they intend to convey by uttering 
bare plurals, why would they need to bother with first learning how to use 
quantifier expressions? Even adults often prefer to use bare plurals instead 
of quantified sentences.  
 According to the radical account, more semantic content is ex-
pressed by a quantified sentence than by a bare plural. For instance, more 
semantic content is expressed by ‘Many barns are red’ than by ‘Barns are 
red’. A child needs to know the meaning of ‘many’ in order to competently 
use the former sentence, whereas she does not need to know the meaning of 
‘many’ to competently use the latter sentence. So, there is an extra cost—an 
extra semantic burden—to a child’s using a quantified sentence over a ge-
neric. Compared to quantified sentences, generics are usually just as effec-
tive as conveying what children want to convey and also place a smaller 
burden on the speaker’s implicit understanding of the language. Therefore, it 
is unsurprising that children learn how to use generics before they learn how 
to use quantified sentences. 
 
4.6 Bound Variables 
It may be objected that the radical account fails to accommodate the fact that 
the variables in the restrictor and scope are bound (Leslie 2015a, p. 36). Af-
                                                                                                                  
already in 13-month-olds” (p. 6, my emphasis.) Leslie (2008, p.19) observes that 
children begin using bare plurals by the time they are two years old, but this means 
that children have the capacity to decipher the communicative intentions of others 
for almost a year before using bare plurals. Children are, by then, surely able to 
form communicative intentions. And, as my discussion in §4.3 indicates, the radical 
does account need not require that such children be able to form specific intentions 
to communicate determinate propositions; it may be indeterminate what they intend 
to communicate. 
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ter all, since Gen is not present in the logical form of bare plurals, there 
seems to be no quantifier to bind such variables. Consider the bare plural 
‘Politicians think that they can outsmart their opponents’ (Leslie 2015a, p. 
36). This bare plural seems to say, roughly speaking, that, for the most part, 
any given politician1 thinks that she1 can outsmart her1 opponents. With the 
binary Gen operator, it is easy to accommodate this reading: 
 
Gen x [x is a politician] [x thinks x can outsmart x’s opponents] 
 
However, without Gen, it is unclear how one can capture this reading. 
 I, however, doubt that there is syntactically marked variable bind-
ing. The very same sentence, ‘Politicians think that they can outsmart their 
opponents’, may be non-figuratively used to assert that most politicians 
think that most mathematicians can outsmart most philosophers’ opponents. 
Imagine that politicians desire that the philosophers’ opponents be defeated. 
Moreover, suppose that they (the politicians) come to believe that the math-
ematicians can outsmart their (the philosophers’) opponents. Alice, who 
knows all about the politicians’ scheming, might utter ‘Politicians think that 
they can outsmart their opponents’ in order to assert that most politicians 
think that most mathematicians can outsmart most philosophers’ oppo-
nents.31 Such an assertion would have to be figurative, however, if there is 
variable binding. But this is not the case.32 
But even granting that I am wrong about this, we could resort to 
representing the variables in the logical form of a bare plural as being bound 
by some uninterpreted binary operator U:33 
 
 U x [Restrictor(x)] [Scope(x)] 
 
U is uninterpreted in that it does not semantically express any semantic rela-
tion between the restrictor and scope. So, bare plurals still lack truth-values. 
Via completion, U is “replaced” by some quantifier in what is communicat-
ed. For example, if one utters ‘Birds fly’ in order to communicate that many 
birds fly, U will be replaced by the quantifier Many in the proposition as-
serted: 
 
 Many x [Bird(x)] [Flies(x)] 
 
                                                 
31 I am indebted to Troy Cross for this example. 
32 Because I do not think pronouns syntactically bind variables, I also view weak 
crossover effects as not providing any evidence for Gen. Leslie (2015a), who takes 
it for granted that pronouns syntactically bind variables, argues that weak crossover 
effects provide evidence for Gen. 
33 Paul Hovda originally suggested that I posit U in order to regiment my claim that 
bare plurals are semantically incomplete and are, in some way, “missing” a quanti-
fier expression. I think the real work U does—if we posit it—is syntactic. 
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Therefore, the radical account can be augmented so as to allow the variable 
binding that supposedly occurs in the logical form of bare plurals. 
 It may here be objected that positing U would sacrifice one of the 
appealing features of the radical account—its promise of a simpler seman-
tics. How is U relevantly different from Gen? Both are binary operators that 
bind variables. How is positing U supposed to make semantic theorizing any 
simpler than positing Gen? Some semantics must be given for U. 
 I, however, insist that positing U allows for a simpler semantics than 
positing Gen. If we posit Gen, then a character, a function from contexts to 
semantic contents, must be provided for Gen. The “semantics” for U are 
much simpler. U has no character. In every context, U is never assigned any 
semantic content.34 That is all there is to know about U. Hence, any sentence 
with U in its logical form is semantically incomplete and thus cannot be 
evaluated for truth. Gen is associated with a character and U is not. There-
fore, the semantics for U is more straightforward than the semantics for 
Gen. 
 Furthermore, U operates as a placeholder for some quantifier that 
the speaker has left out. The presence of U in the logical form of a bare plu-
ral merely indicates that what is strictly said is in need of completion. U in-
dicates that a bare plural has the “abstract” logical form of a quantified sen-
tence but lacks a complete meaning.35 Gen, on the other hand, is a supposed-
ly full-fledged member of the lexicon with labyrinthine rules governing its 
semantic contribution to a sentence. Because U merely indicates a gap that 
Gen rashly rushes in to fill, there is an important sense in which Gen has a 
meaning and U does not. Any semantic theory that posits Gen thus multi-
plies meanings unnecessarily. 
 Again, I want to emphasize that the radical account, as I conceive of 
it, is noncommittal with regards to the existence of U. I only wish to point 
out that if we want something to perform the syntactic job that Gen does, we 
can satisfy this desideratum in a way that is compatible with the radical ac-
count. We need only posit U. 
 
4.7 Scope Interactions 
It may be objected that the radical account is unable to accommodate appar-
ent scope interactions present in bare plurals. Compare (9a) with (10a):36 
 
                                                 
34 Characters, à la Kaplan (1989), are functions from contexts to contents. U, being 
uninterpreted, never receives any content. As a result, U has no character. By the 
definition of what a function is, there is no function from any non-empty set to the 
empty set. 
35 Thanks to Will Fleisher and Paul Hovda for helpful discussion of this point. 
36 For the original articulation of this worry, see Carlson 1989, 170–171. Carlson’s 
famous example is ‘Hurricanes arise in this part of the Pacific’, which seems to 
have two readings. I opt for (10a) instead of Carlson’s sentence. I find (10a) easier 
to work with. But analogs of what I say about (10a) will also hold for ‘Hurricanes 
arise in this part of the Pacific’. 
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(9a) All boys love some girl. 
(9b) For each boy, there is some girl or other that he loves. 
(9c) There is some girl that every boy loves. 
(10a) Boys love some girl.  
(10b) Generically many boys are such that there is some girl or oth-
er that he loves. 
(10c) There is some girl that generically many boys love. 
 
(9a) clearly exhibits scope ambiguities. It has readings (9b) and (9c). This 
ambiguity arises because (9a) does not determine whether to give the uni-
versal quantifier or the existential quantifier wide scope. (9b) is the reading 
on which the universal quantifier is given wide scope; (9c) is the reading on 
which the existential quantifier is given narrow scope. 
(10a), a bare plural, also seems to exhibit scope ambiguities. It has 
readings (10b) and (10c). This ambiguity is naturally explained if—contra 
the radical account—Gen exists. Gen has the syntax of a quantifier expres-
sion. If Gen exists, we may explain the ambiguity by insisting that (10a) 
does not determine whether to give Gen or the existential quantifier wide 
scope. (10b) is the reading on which Gen is given wide scope; (10c) is the 
reading on which the existential quantifier is given wide scope. 
I reply that if we posit U, we may explain the scope ambiguities 
present in (10a) just as well as the Gen theorist can. If U exists, we may ex-
plain the ambiguity by insisting that (10a) does not determine whether to 
give U or the existential quantifier wide scope. (10b) is the reading on which 
U is given wide scope; (10c) is the reading on which the existential quantifi-
er is given wide scope. A syntactic phenomenon calls for a syntactic expla-
nation. Both Gen and U are on a par syntactically. 
But I am not convinced that we have a genuinely syntactic phenom-
enon here. Consider the following case of Elugardo and Stainton’s (2004, p. 
442 fn1, their emphasis): 
 
Jose owns a grocery store. On Fridays, a peculiar looking 
man comes in, picks up a fruit and sniffs it; he then picks up 
a different fruit and sniffs it; he then leaves. The man seems 
to have no preference about which fruit he sniffs: some-
times it’s an apple and a kiwi, sometimes it’s a grapefruit 
and a pear, etc. Jose’s daughter has seen this happen several 
times. After one such visit by the peculiar looking man, Jose 
says to his daughter: ‘Every Friday’. He could thereby as-
sert: [Every x: Friday][There are two y: fruit][He sniffs y on 
x]…Indeed, there can…be binding with scope interactions, 
without syntactic variables in the expression used. Thus if 
we alter the scenario slightly, such that the man always 
sniffs the same two fruits, Jose could use ‘Every Friday’ to 
assert a proposition that has [There are two fruit y: fruits] 
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taking wide scope over [Every x: Friday], instead of vice 
versa. 
 
In this case, there is—as it were—scope ambiguity at the level of what is 
asserted. Let ‘Stan’ name Jose’s fruit sniffer. Jose can utter the subsentential 
expression ‘Every Friday’ and complete it in either of two ways: 
 
(11) Every Friday, there are two fruits that Stan sniffs. 
(12) There are two fruits such that, every Friday, Stan sniffs 
them.  
 
But it is not as though there is a covert quantifier expression in the logical 
form of ‘Every Friday’. Scope interactions can be introduced pragmatically. 
But then the alleged scope ambiguities present in (10a) need not be ex-
plained by appeal to Gen. Just as (11) and (12) present distinct readings of 
‘Every Friday’ even though it lacks covert quantifier expressions, (10b) and 
(10c) can present distinct readings of (10a) even if it lacks covert quantifica-
tional structure. And, on the radical account, it is to be expected that both 
(10a) and ‘Every Friday’—as used in Elugardo and Stainton’s case—seem 
to exhibit scope ambiguities. Speakers complete both expressions by adding, 
at least, a quantifier to what is said. That a quantifier is contributed pragmat-
ically—by completion—is the source of the scope ambiguities.37 
 
4.8 Grammaticality 
It may be objected that, on the radical account, it is mysterious why bare 
plurals are syntactically well-formed sentences.38 Consider (11), a phrase 
structure for ‘Many birds fly’:39 
 
 
(11) 
 
 
                                                 
37 Elugardo and Stainton’s case also tells against the previous objection. In their 
case, there seems to be—as it were—pragmatically introduced binding at the level 
of what is asserted. Therefore, just because ‘Politicians think they can outsmart their 
opponents’ has a reading on which there seems to be binding, it does not follow that 
there is syntactic binding. 
38 Thanks to Mark Hinchliff for helpful discussion here. 
39 I use Heim and Kratzer (1998, p. 146) as my guide here. 
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On the model of (11), Gen theorists might see (12) as an adequate phrase 
structure for the bare plural ‘Birds fly’:40  
 
(12) 
 
 
The difference between (11) and (12) is that they contain different 
determiners. In (11), it is ‘many’. In (12), it is Gen. (11) and (12) share their 
syntactic structure. Clearly, ‘Many birds fly’ is a syntactically well-formed 
sentence. So, for a Gen theorist, ‘Birds fly’ is too. 
But how does the radical account secure the syntactic well-
formedness of bare plurals? It cannot appeal to Gen. The answer depends on 
whether U is accepted. If a proponent of the radical account helps herself to 
U, then she can give the same sort of answer as the Gen theorist. Consider 
the phrase structure (13): 
 
(13) 
 
 
U is a determiner just as much as ‘Many’ is. Unlike ‘Many’, however, U is 
not semantically rich enough to contribute to the truth conditions of a 
sentence it is a part of. As such, if (13) represents the syntactic structure of 
‘Birds fly’, then ‘Birds fly’ is syntactically well-formed even if it does not 
express a proposition. ‘Birds fly’ expresses a mere propositional radical. 
                                                 
40 It is common to view Gen as an adverb of quantification, but I put that view aside 
in order to simplify discussion. If Gen is an adverb, some analogs of what I say be-
low still hold. Moreover, if Gen is an adverb, the objection considered in this sec-
tion becomes less compelling. Adverbs are—for the most part—thought to be op-
tional. This would explain why Gen theorists who believe Gen is an adverb of quan-
tification are at pains to provide syntactic evidence for Gen through either (i) obser-
vations concerning variable binding or (ii) observations concerning scope interac-
tions. See §4.6 and §4.7 for my views on such alleged syntactic evidence.  
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 Instead suppose that the proponent of the radical account chooses 
not to help herself to U. I think she should then view (14) as an adequate 
phrase structure for ‘Birds fly’: 
 
(14) 
  
 
Objection: Why is ‘Birds fly’ syntactically well-formed? In contrast to 
‘Birds fly’, the bare singular sentence ‘Bird flies’ is not well-formed. ‘Bird 
flies’ is missing a determiner. ‘The bird flies’, for instance, is well-formed. 
Why would it be any different with ‘Birds fly’? It seems mysterious that 
‘Birds fly’ could be a well-formed sentence without a (covert) determiner. 
But if we do not help ourselves to U (or Gen), where is the determiner?  
 One possible reply: It is—as it were—a general syntactic rule of 
English that bare plural noun phrases need not be preceded by any 
determiner. If we go this route, we make a tradeoff in syntactic theorizing. 
On the one hand, we posit an additional rule that applies to just bare plural 
noun phrases.41 On the other hand, we eliminate the need to posit covert 
determiners that precede bare plural noun phrases. To alleviate any sense of 
ad hocery, note that we already have to posit local syntactic rules to explain 
why some sentences are well-formed but others are not:42 
 
(15a) Al finished. 
(15b) # Al completed. 
(16a) One is here. 
(16b) # A is here. 
 
There seems to be no semantic or pragmatic explanation for why (15a) and 
(16a) are felicitous but (15b) and (16b) are not. And no general syntactic 
principle seems to explain this either. It is just, as it were, a brute syntactic 
rule that (15a) and (16a) are well-formed but (15b) and (16b) are not. 
Likewise, we might think it is a brute syntactic rule that, in English, bare 
                                                 
41 But perhaps there are more exceptions than just bare plural noun phrases. Mass 
nouns, pronouns, and most proper names do not require pronounced determiners. 
Effectively, I am proposing that there are some exceptions to the DP hypothesis, 
which was first advanced by Abney (1987). The DP hypothesis is the syntactic hy-
pothesis that all noun phrases are headed by some determiner. The DP hypothesis is 
controversial. Thanks to Kent Bach for helpful discussion. 
42 For a brief discussion of (15a) and (15b), see Bach (1994, p. 128). I learned of 
(16a) and (16b) from John Hawthorne, who attributes them to Barbara Partee. 
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plural nouns need not be preceded by determiners. One nice additional 
consequence is that we can also accommodate why (17a) is well-formed but 
(17b) is not. In (17a), a bare plural noun (i.e. ‘books’) plays the grammatical 
role of object, whereas, in (17b) a bare singular count noun (i.e. ‘book’) 
plays this role: 
 
(17a) Ann owns books. 
(17b) # Ann owns book. 
 
(17b) is ungrammatical because ‘book’—unlike the plural ‘books’ in 
(17a)—has to be preceded by a determiner like ‘the’. 
A second possible reply: In English, bare plural sentences are 
syntactically well-formed because bare plural noun phrases are, syntactically 
speaking, proper names of kinds.43 Bare plural sentences are just as 
syntactically well-formed as simple object-predicate sentences. But bare 
plural noun phrases1 get semantically type-shifted down so as to express 
properties when they1 are followed by individual-level predicates.44  
Compare sentences (18) and (19): 
 
(18) Dinosaurs are extinct. 
(19) Birds fly. 
 
(18) says, of the kind dinosaur, that it is extinct. (19), on the other hand, is a 
characterizing sentence that is used to make a generalization over individual 
birds. Kinds do not fly. Individual birds fly. Nonetheless, (18) and (19) 
share their syntactic structure. Each is as syntactically well-formed as the 
other. The difference is semantic. In (19), ‘birds’ is type-shifted down so as 
to pick out a property of individuals. There is no type-shifting in (18). 
 Therefore, we have not been given conclusive reason to believe that 
the radical account—with or without U—cannot secure the syntactic well-
formedness of (characterizing) bare plural sentences.  
 
4.9 Unification Under Gen? 
It may be objected that the radical account misses out on a powerful uniform 
treatment of generics that Gen can provide. Gen is standardly appealed to in 
the semantics for bare plural, definite singular, and indefinite singular gener-
ics. Gen theorists will likely see the scope of linguistic expressions that can 
be given a semantics with Gen as an advantage of positing Gen. The radical 
account, however, does not say anything about definite singulars or indefi-
                                                 
43 For an early view on which bare plural noun phrases always behave semantically 
as proper names of kinds, see Carlson (1977). Liebesman (2011) also defends this 
view. 
44 For a seminal discussion on semantic type-shifting, see Partee (2002). For discus-
sion on type-shifting down bare plural noun phrases, see Chierchia (1998), Cohen 
(1996), Cohen (2007), and Leslie (2015a). 
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nite singulars. It is unclear whether the radical account can generalize to def-
inite singulars and indefinite singulars. It is not as obvious that standard uses 
of such expressions exhibit the variety data nearly as strongly as bare plurals 
do.45 As a result, one may believe that a Gen theory is preferable to the radi-
cal account on the grounds that a Gen theory covers more expressions. 
 I, however, do hold out some hope that the radical account may be 
extended to definite and indefinite singular generics. While I must concede 
that such singular generics appear to display the variety data less strongly 
than bare plurals, this is not to say that singular generics fail to display the 
variety data at all. And if singular generics display the variety data at all, 
there is some motivation to extend the radical account to such expressions. 
On this extended account, speakers can straightforwardly make assertions 
by uttering singular generics only by completing what is said—a mere prop-
ositional radical.   
 Here, I will only provide some evidence for “homosingular” use 
variety, whereby different tokens of the same indefinite or definite singular 
type is used to (non-figuratively) communicate different sorts of proposi-
tions. 
 First, consider the indefinite singular ‘A man is pale’. Suppose that 
Steven has never seen or heard of any non-pale man. Steven might utter ‘A 
man is pale’ in order to communicate that, under normal conditions, all men 
are pale.46 This is a claim about what is normal for men. On the other hand, 
suppose that Alice lives in a society in which paleness is deeply valued. In 
this hypothetical society, no men are in fact pale. Nonetheless, pale men are 
thought to be particularly attractive. Alice might utter ‘A man is pale’ in 
order to communicate that, ideally, any man is pale. This is a claim about 
what is ideal for men. Therefore, a speaker might utter ‘A man is pale’ in 
order to communicate either a claim about what is normal or a claim about 
what is ideal.47 Therefore, indefinite singular generics display at least some 
homosingular use variety. 
                                                 
45 For instance, it is not obvious to me that ‘The raven is white’ or ‘A raven is 
white’ may be used to communicate a mere statistical generalization over ravens. 
Utterances of such expressions do not seem appropriate even if all ravens were 
painted white earlier today. On the other hand, a speaker may clearly utter the bare 
plural ‘Ravens are white’ in order to communicate a mere statistical generalization 
over ravens. The range of standard uses of definite and indefinite singulars seems 
more constrained than the range of standard uses of bare plurals. 
46 I have the intuition that Steven would be more likely to convey a normality claim 
rather a mere statistical generalization over men. If all men are forced to undergo 
some medical procedure that makes them temporarily tan today, Steven may still 
continue to felicitously utter ‘A man is pale’.  This is naturally explained if Steven 
is asserting some (false) claim about what is normal for men. After all, Steven be-
lieves it is normal for all men to be pale. 
47 One might think that Steven, in the first case, is also making a claim about what is 
ideal when he utters ‘A man is pale’. However, a variant of the case makes it clear 
that Steven is not making such a claim about what is ideal. Suppose Steven is dis-
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 Now, consider the definite singular ‘The mosquito transmits malar-
ia’. In an ordinary context, Alan might utter this generic in order to com-
municate that a few mosquitoes transmit malaria. This is a statistical gener-
alization over mosquitoes. On the other hand, suppose that everyone has 
been vaccinated against malaria such that malaria is completely harmless. 
Suppose that Beth incorrectly believes that it lies in the essence of mosqui-
toes that they transmit malaria. We may even suppose that she knows that 
her friend Suzy knows that she, Beth, has this strange essentialist belief 
about mosquitos. In a conversation with Suzy, Beth might utter ‘The mos-
quito transmits malaria’ in order to communicate the (false) proposition that 
all mosquitoes essentially transmit malaria. This is a claim about the essence 
of mosquitoes. Therefore, a speaker may utter ‘The mosquito transmits ma-
laria’ in order to communicate a statistical generalization over mosquitoes 
or what lies in the essence of mosquitoes. Therefore, definite singular gener-
ics display at least some homosingular use variety. 
 Given this homosingular use variety, there is some reason to extend 
the radical account so as to cover definite and indefinite singular generics.48 
If so, then it seems that Gen theories have no advantage in explanatory pow-
er over the radical account.  
We should be interested in the prospects of extending the radical ac-
count. If it can be done, then we may simplify semantic theorizing by dis-
pensing with Gen, a mysterious quantifier expression that is never pro-
nounced in any natural language. I concede that I have not provided knock-
down evidence that the radical account may be so extended. But I have pro-
vided some evidence—homosingular use variety. Therefore, there is some 
reason to believe that the account may be so extended. I leave it up to future 
work to fully investigate the matter.  
                                                                                                                  
gusted by paleness and thinks that it would be ideal if everyone were tan, not pale. 
Still, Steven might utter ‘A man is pale’ in order to communicate that, under normal 
conditions, any man is pale. 
48 I also am optimistic that the radical account may even be extended so as to cover 
bare singular generics (e.g. ‘Gold is yellow) and habituals (e.g. ‘Donald smokes’). 
‘Gold is yellow’ may be used to either to make a make a mere statistical generaliza-
tion over most gold stuff or to make a claim about what it is to be yellow. (Kant, for 
instance, allegedly took ‘Gold is yellow’ to be analytic.) This is an instance of ho-
mosingular use variety. On the other hand, in ordinary contexts, ‘Donald smokes’ 
may be used to communicate that Donald sometimes smokes; in the presence of 
chain smokers, ‘Donald smokes’ may be used to communicate that Donald fre-
quently smokes. This is an instance of “homohabitual” statistical variety. I am opti-
mistic, then, that the radical account may be extended to handle definite singulars, 
indefinite singulars, bare singulars, and habituals. This would be a powerful ac-
count. I leave the task of defending such an ambitious view to future work. I do not 
discuss bare singulars or habituals in the main text in order to ease discussion. Bare 
plurals, definite singulars, and indefinite singulars have attracted the most attention 
in the literature on generics. 
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And the radical account might be defensible even if it cannot be ex-
tended to cover definite and indefinite singulars. A bare plural generic may 
be felicitous even if its corresponding definite singular generic or indefinite 
singular generic is not (Krifka et al. 1995, pp. 11–13):49 
 
(20) a. Madrigals are popular. 
       b. # A madrigal is popular. 
(21) a. Green bottles have narrow necks. 
       b. # The green bottle has a narrow neck. 
(22) a. Women from Seattle are left-handed.  
       b. # The woman from Seattle is left-handed. 
       c. #  A woman from Seattle is left-handed. 
 
(20a) is felicitous, but (20b) is not. (21a) is felicitous, but (21b) is not. I 
claim, there is at least one context such that (22a) is felicitous but neither 
(22b) nor (22c) is.50 Suppose that, by pure accident, that the majority of 
women from Seattle are left-handed. If Alice has surveyed Seattleites and 
has determined that most women from Seattle are—by pure accident—left-
handed, then Alice can easily report her findings by uttering (22a), but not 
(22b) or (22c). We are intuitively inclined to say that (22b) or (22c) would 
be true only if there was some non-accidental correlation between being a 
woman from Seattle and being left-handed. Whereas Alice may felicitously 
follow up on (22a) with ‘and this is so by pure accident’, it does not seem 
she can do so with either (22b) or (22c). Even if (22b) or (22c) could—in 
some unusual context—be non-figuratively used to convey the information 
that Alice uses (22a) to convey, there are still contexts in which only 
(22a)—and neither (22b) nor (22c)—will do the job. This is all I require. 
 One possible explanation of this phenomenon is that the semantics 
for bare plurals is distinct from that of definite singulars are indefinite singu-
lars. A Gen theorist could accommodate this by positing GenBP (for bare 
plurals), GenDS (for definite singulars), and GenIS (for indefinite singulars) 
such that GenBP ≠ GenDS and GenBP ≠ GenIS.51 If this is the Gen theorist’s 
                                                 
49 Restrict your attention to the generic—or characterizing—readings of the definite 
and indefinite singulars below. There is, for instance, a reading of (21b) on which it 
is asserted that a contextually salient green bottle has a narrow neck. But this is not 
a reading I am interested in here. That is not a generic reading of (21b). 
50 As Wasserman (2011, 432) notes, the linguistic orthodoxy seems to be that (22a) 
cannot be felicitous unless there is some non-accidental correlation between being a 
woman from Seattle and being left-handed. But the Gricean cancellation test sug-
gests that such a connection need not exist in order for (22a) to be felicitous (Was-
serman 2011, p. 449 fn30). ‘Women from Seattle are left-handed, and this is so by 
pure accident’ is—at least in certain contexts—felicitous.  
51 A natural way of understanding Greenberg’s (2003, p. 300) view that only bare 
plurals can express “descriptive” generalizations—whereas indefinite singulars and 
bare plurals can both express “in virtue of” generalizations—is to see her as claim-
ing that GenBP ≠ GenIS.  
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view, then the radical account of bare plurals need not be extended so as to 
cover definite singulars and indefinite singulars. The radical account need 
only deny the existence of GenBP. A proponent of the radical account could 
even accept the existence of GenDS and GenIS if she so wished. 
 There are, then, at least two ways for the proponent of the radical 
account to respond to the following objection: Her account cannot be ex-
tended so as to cover definite singulars and indefinite singulars. First, she 
could argue that the radical account can, in fact, be extended so as to cover 
such expressions. Second, she could argue that the radical account need not 
be so extended. I believe that it is prudent for the radical account to be—
officially speaking anyways—noncommittal as to which approach is better. 
 
5. Conclusion 
The radical account is worthy of serious attention. This novel approach 
promises to shed light on a class of puzzling, and yet commonplace, sen-
tences in natural language. And the radical account does this while dissolv-
ing—not entering—the vexed debates over the semantics of Gen. The varie-
ty data is not to be explained semantically, but by the varying communica-
tive intentions of speakers in different contexts. This is all to the good. 
 I close with some remarks on broader significance of the radical 
account. I have met some philosophers who are skeptical of the importance 
of semantic theorizing about bare plurals. To them, the topic is nothing but a 
mere toy for the bored philosopher to play with and then discard without a 
second thought.  
Unsurprisingly, I reject this caricature. Bare plurals constitute a 
ubiquitous class of expressions in ordinary language. It would be narrow-
sighted of us to regard such a pervasive piece of language as unworthy of 
serious theorizing. 
 Moreover, Leslie (2014, p. 209) observes that “generic language 
may be implicated in the transmission of beliefs that form the backbone of 
social prejudice.” It certainly is. Many socially prejudicial claims are assert-
ed by bare plural generics. It would be wrong to be willfully tone-deaf to 
this use of bare plurals. We should be interested in investigating language 
that can sometimes be put to such socially harmful uses. We might learn 
how to better combat the pernicious effects of such language. 
 The radical account is suggestive of an intuitive picture of these so-
cially prejudicial uses of bare plurals.52 Call a bare plural in which the kind 
term picks out a social group a ‘social-kind bare plural’. Suppose that ‘K’ 
picks out some social group and that ‘F’ picks out some undesirable proper-
ty. A speaker who utters ‘Ks F’ in isolation leaves it open—for example—
that she means that, in general, Ks are inherently disposed to F. After all, it 
is common knowledge that social-kind bare plurals are often used to convey 
such socially prejudicial beliefs. If the speaker wishes to convey a mere sta-
                                                 
52 Thanks to Troy Cross for helpful discussion here. 
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tistical generalization, she must immediately qualify what she meant. For 
example, consider the following dialogue: 
 
Cathy: Ks F. 
Doris: You do realize that Ks are no more likely to F than 
non-Ks, right? 
Cathy: Sure. But I only meant that some Ks F. 
Doris: Oh, of course that is true. But by those standards, 
non-Ks F too. 
 
Doris—justifiably—initially interpreted Cathy to mean that Ks are dispro-
portionately disposed to F. Suppose, that this was indeed what Cathy origi-
nally meant. But if Cathy aimed to have a congenial conversation with Do-
ris, Cathy can easily (and surreptitiously!) retract her claim without obvious-
ly contradicting herself. This is so because, on the radical account, no bare 
plural expresses any proposition. If all Doris has to go on is the semantic 
content of what Cathy uttered,53 then Cathy has plausible deniability. There 
is some sense in which Cathy was free to tell Doris that she, Cathy, merely 
meant a mere statistical generalization over Ks. This would be a conversa-
tional sleight of hand on Cathy’s part, but one that is difficult to detect. 
 Contrast this above dialogue with the following one: 
 
Elaine: Ks F. 
Freida: You do realize that Ks are no more likely to F than 
non-Ks, right? 
Elaine: No, that is wrong. Ks are more likely to F. It lies in 
their nature. 
Freida: That is a ridiculous thing to believe. 
 
Elaine was in a more confrontational mood than Cathy. Unlike Cathy, 
Elaine did not (even surreptitiously!) retract her bigoted assertion. Social-
kind bare plurals, like ‘Ks F’, often allow the bigot to pick and choose her 
fights. In the face of resistance, she can—as Elaine did—voice disagree-
ment. Or, she can—as Cathy did—retreat to a mere statistical generalization. 
But there is more. Contrast the above two dialogues with the following one:                     
 
Gene: Ks F. 
Hugo: I know, right? Ks are horrible. 
Gene: Tell me about it. It lies in their nature to F. 
Hugo: I am happy to learn you feel that way too. 
                                                 
53 It is not strictly speaking true that all Doris has to go on is the semantic content of 
what Cathy uttered (i.e. ‘Ks F’). Of course, Doris also has the background belief 
that that Cathy speaks English, that Cathy uttered ‘Ks F’, that Cathy is human, etc. 
Importantly, however, Doris does not antecedently believe that Cathy believes that, 
in general, Ks are inherently disposed to F. 
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In this dialogue, Gene engages in a congenial conversation with his fellow 
bigot, Hugo. As I hope is evident, social-kind bare plurals are a useful con-
versational tool for the bigot. They allow bigots to easily pick and choose 
their fights and to befriend fellow bigots. This flexibility is easily explained 
if bare plurals are semantically incomplete. Speakers, after all, choose how 
to portray their communicative intentions to their audiences. It is because 
bare plurals are semantically incomplete that they can be put to toxic pur-
poses. Perhaps Leslie (2014, p. 226) is right to claim that “it would…be po-
tentially very beneficial to cease to use generic language when discussing 
social phenomena.”  
 The radical account also has some implications for philosophical 
theories that appeal to bare plurals. For instance, Nickel (2010, p. 22) has 
argued that “some cp-laws [ceteris paribus laws] are most naturally stated by 
the use of characterizing sentences.” And the characterizing sentences he 
appeals to are bare plurals.54 If we accept this part of Nickel’s view and the 
radical account, then we are committed to the following surprising claim: 
Ceteris paribus laws are neither true nor false. Of course, when a speaker 
utters a bare plural expressing a ceteris paribus law, she makes some asser-
tion. But we cannot read the content of her assertion off of the semantic con-
tent of the bare plural she uttered.55 
Just to be clear, I am not endorsing this view of ceteris paribus laws. 
I merely wish to point out that the radical account has philosophical implica-
tions outside of the philosophy of language. 
The radical account, then, is not an idle cog in a pointless machine. 
The cog is not idle. Nor is the machine pointless. Mere curiosity in bare plu-
rals is motivation enough to be interested in the radical account. But the ac-
count has impact on our philosophical theorizing even outside of seman-
tics.56 
 
 
                                                 
54 Nickel (2010, p. 11) explicitly states that he will “focus on sentences with bare 
plural subjects.” 
55 Thanks to Ellie Cohen for helpful discussion here. 
56 For helpful conversations and comments on this paper, I wish to thank Kent Bach, 
Mark Bedau, David Boonin, Sean Burke, Ellie Cohen, David Clark, Charlotte 
Figueroa, Will Fleisher, Graeme Forbes, Jaime Castillo Gamboa, Nicholas Gigliotti, 
George Goodell, Jeremy Goodman, Brian Haas, John Hawthorne, Mark Hinchliff, 
Paul Hovda, Jeremy Goodman, Mahmoud Jalloh, James Kirkpatrick, Julie Martin, 
Elli Neufeld, Ezra Schwartz, Rachel Sterken, Elias Stern-Rodriguez, Andrew Stew-
art, Gabriel Uzquiano, Elise Woodard, and Seth Yalcin. For particularly helpful and 
thorough comments on this paper, I wish to thank an anonymous reviewer from 
Philosophical Studies. For helpful discussion, I wish to thank audience members at 
a meeting of the Reed College Philosophy Colloquium, two meetings of the Univer-
sity of Southern California Speculative Society, and a meeting of the Minnesota 
Philosophical Society. Most of all, however, I wish to thank Troy Cross, with whom 
I have had numerous long and insightful conversations on the topic of this paper. 
Had I not been fortunate enough to receive Troy’s mentorship, this paper would 
be—if existent at all—substantially worse than it actually is. 
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